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Protected User Data: Contact List

ID Name
T1636.001 Calendar Entries
T1636.002 Call Log
T1636.003 Contact List
T1636.004 SMS Messages
T1636.005 Accounts

Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Contacts Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the Contacts framework.

If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the Contact List without the user’s knowledge or approval.

ID: T1636.003
Sub-technique of:  T1636
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
ⓘ
Tactic: Collection
ⓘ
Platforms: Android, iOS
ⓘ
MTC ID: APP-13
Version: 1.1
Created: 01 April 2022
Last Modified: 12 May 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1061 AbstractEmu

AbstractEmu can grant itself contact list access.[1]
S0309 Adups

Adups transmitted contact lists.[2]
S1095 AhRat

AhRat can collect the device’s contact list.[3]
S0304 Android/Chuli.A

Android/Chuli.A stole contact list data stored both on the the phone and the SIM card.[4]
S0292 AndroRAT

AndroRAT collects contact list information.[5][6]

S0422 Anubis

Anubis can steal the device’s contact list.[7]

S0540 Asacub

Asacub can collect the device’s contact list.[8]
S1079 BOULDSPY

BOULDSPY can exfiltrate a device’s contacts.[9]
C0033 C0033

During C0033, PROMETHIUM used StrongPity to collect the device’s contact list.[10]

S0480 Cerberus

Cerberus can obtain the device’s contact list.[11]
S0323 Charger

Charger steals contacts from the victim user's device.[12]
S0425 Corona Updates

Corona Updates can collect device contacts.[13]
S9004 Crocodilus

Crocodilus has the ability to collect the contact list.[14]
S1243 DCHSpy

DCHSpy has accessed the device’s contact list.[15]
S0505 Desert Scorpion

Desert Scorpion can collect the device’s contact list.[16]
S9005 DocSwap

DocSwap has requested for the READ_CONTACTS and WRITE_CONTACTS permissions and has the ability to send contact information.[17][18]
S0550 DoubleAgent

DoubleAgent has accessed the contact list.[19]
S0507 eSurv

eSurv can exfiltrate the device’s contact list.[20]
S0522 Exobot

Exobot can access the device’s contact list.[21]
S0405 Exodus

Exodus Two can download the address book.[22]

S1080 Fakecalls

Fakecalls can copy and exfiltrate a device’s contact list.[23]
S0509 FakeSpy

FakeSpy can collect the device’s contact list.[24]
S0408 FlexiSpy

FlexiSpy can collect device contacts.[25]
S1067 FluBot

FluBot has used the contact list to infect more devices.[26][27]

S0423 Ginp

Ginp can download the device’s contact list.[28]
S1231 GodFather

GodFather has accessed the device’s contact list.[29]
S0535 Golden Cup

Golden Cup can collect the device’s contact list.[30]
S0551 GoldenEagle

GoldenEagle has collected a list of contacts.[19]
S0421 GolfSpy

GolfSpy can obtain the device’s contact list.[31]
S0536 GPlayed

GPlayed can access the device’s contact list.[32]
S0406 Gustuff

Gustuff can collect the contact list.[33]

S0544 HenBox

HenBox can access the device’s contact list.[34]
S1128 HilalRAT

HilalRAT can retrieve a device’s contact list.[35]
S1077 Hornbill

Hornbill can collect device contacts.[36]
S0463 INSOMNIA

INSOMNIA can collect the device’s contact list.[37]
S1185 LightSpy

LightSpy has accessed the device’s contact list.[38][39][40][41][42]
S0485 Mandrake

Mandrake can access the device’s contact list.[43]
S0407 Monokle

Monokle can retrieve the device's contact list.[44]
S0399 Pallas

Pallas accesses the device contact list.[45]
S0316 Pegasus for Android

Pegasus for Android accesses contact list information.[46]
S0289 Pegasus for iOS

Pegasus for iOS gathers contacts from the system by dumping the victim's address book.[47]
S1126 Phenakite

Phenakite can exfiltrate the victim device’s contact list.[48]

S1241 RatMilad

RatMilad has accessed the device’s contact list.[49]
S0539 Red Alert 2.0

Red Alert 2.0 can collect the device’s contact list.[50]
S0403 Riltok

Riltok can access and upload the device's contact list to the command and control server.[51]
S0411 Rotexy

Rotexy can access and upload the contacts list to the command and control server.[52]
S0549 SilkBean

SilkBean can access device contacts.[19]
S1195 SpyC23

SpyC23 can exfiltrate the victim device’s contact list.[53][54][55]
S0324 SpyDealer

SpyDealer harvests contact lists from victims.[56]
S0305 SpyNote RAT

SpyNote RAT can view contacts.[57]
S0328 Stealth Mango

Stealth Mango uploads contact lists for various third-party applications such as Yahoo, AIM, GoogleTalk, Skype, QQ, and others.[58]
S1082 Sunbird

Sunbird can exfiltrate a device's contacts.[36]
S1069 TangleBot

TangleBot can request permission to view device contacts.[59]
S0558 Tiktok Pro

Tiktok Pro can access the device's contact list.[60]

S9006 VajraSpy

VajraSpy has collected and exfiltrated the contact list.[61][62]

S0506 ViperRAT

ViperRAT can collect the device’s contact list.[63]
G0112 Windshift

Windshift has included contact list exfiltration in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL.[64]
S0489 WolfRAT

WolfRAT can collect the device’s contact list.[65]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1011 User Guidance

Contact list access is an uncommonly needed permission, so users should be instructed to use extra scrutiny when granting access to their contact list.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0679 Detection of Contact List AN1782

For Android, detect Contact List by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: ContentResolver.query(ContactsContract) with projection=all_fields]; Network Traffic Flow via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.
AN1783

For iOS, detect Contact List by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: CNContactStore.enumerateContacts with CNContactFetchRequest.keysToFetch containing all contact keys by app NOT IN $ApprovedContactsApps$]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.

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