1. Home
  2. Techniques
  3. Mobile
  4. Protected User Data
  5. Call Log

Protected User Data: Call Log

ID Name
T1636.001 Calendar Entries
T1636.002 Call Log
T1636.003 Contact List
T1636.004 SMS Messages
T1636.005 Accounts

Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather call log data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Call Log Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access the call log.

If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the Call Log without the user’s knowledge or approval.

ID: T1636.002
Sub-technique of:  T1636
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
ⓘ
Tactic: Collection
ⓘ
Platforms: Android, iOS
ⓘ
MTC ID: APP-13
Version: 1.1
Created: 01 April 2022
Last Modified: 12 May 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1061 AbstractEmu

AbstractEmu can access device call logs.[1]
S0309 Adups

Adups transmitted call logs.[2]
S1095 AhRat

AhRat can collect the device’s call log.[3]
S0304 Android/Chuli.A

Android/Chuli.A stole call logs.[4]
S0292 AndroRAT

AndroRAT collects call logs.[5][6]

S1079 BOULDSPY

BOULDSPY can access device call logs.[7]
C0033 C0033

During C0033, PROMETHIUM used StrongPity to collect call logs.[8]

S0425 Corona Updates

Corona Updates can collect the device’s call log.[9]
S1243 DCHSpy

DCHSpy has accessed the device’s call log.[10]
S9005 DocSwap

DocSwap has requested for the READ_CALL_LOG and WRITE_CALL_LOG permissions and has the ability to send call logs.[11][12]

S0550 DoubleAgent

DoubleAgent has accessed the call logs.[13]
S1054 Drinik

Drinik can request the READ_CALL_LOG permission.[14]
S0320 DroidJack

DroidJack captures call data.[15]
S1092 Escobar

Escobar can access the device’s call log.[16]
S0405 Exodus

Exodus Two can exfiltrate the call log.[17]

S1080 Fakecalls

Fakecalls can access the device’s call log.[18]
S0182 FinFisher

FinFisher accesses and exfiltrates the call log.[19]
S0551 GoldenEagle

GoldenEagle has collected call logs.[13]
S0421 GolfSpy

GolfSpy can obtain the device’s call log.[20]
S0544 HenBox

HenBox has collected all outgoing phone numbers that start with "86".[21]
S1077 Hornbill

Hornbill can gather device call logs.[22]
S0463 INSOMNIA

INSOMNIA can retrieve the call history.[23]
S1185 LightSpy

LightSpy has accessed the device’s call log.[24][25][26][27][28]
S0407 Monokle

Monokle can retrieve call history.[29]
S0399 Pallas

Pallas accesses and exfiltrates the call log.[19]
S0316 Pegasus for Android

Pegasus for Android accesses call logs.[30]
S0289 Pegasus for iOS

Pegasus for iOS captures call logs.[31]
S1241 RatMilad

RatMilad has accessed the device’s call log.[32]

S0539 Red Alert 2.0

Red Alert 2.0 can collect the device’s call log.[33]
S0549 SilkBean

SilkBean can access call logs.[13]
S1195 SpyC23

SpyC23 can exfiltrate the call log.[34]
S0324 SpyDealer

SpyDealer harvests phone call history from victims.[35]
S0328 Stealth Mango

Stealth Mango uploads call logs.[36]
S1082 Sunbird

Sunbird can exfiltrate call logs.[22]
S0329 Tangelo

Tangelo contains functionality to gather call logs.[36]
S1069 TangleBot

TangleBot can request permission to view call logs.[37]
S0558 Tiktok Pro

Tiktok Pro can collect the device’s call logs.[38]
S9006 VajraSpy

VajraSpy has collected and exfiltrated the call log.[39][40]

S0418 ViceLeaker

ViceLeaker can collect the device’s call log.[41]
S0506 ViperRAT

ViperRAT can collect the device’s call log.[42]
S0489 WolfRAT

WolfRAT can collect the device’s call log.[43]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1011 User Guidance

Call Log access an uncommonly needed permission, so users should be instructedto use extra scrutiny when granting access to their call logs.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0602 Detection of Call Log AN1650

For Android, detect Call Log by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: ContentResolver.query(CallLog.Calls) with query_count > $CallLogQueryThreshold$ by app NOT IN $ApprovedDialerApps$]; Network Traffic Flow via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.
AN1651

For iOS, detect Call Log by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application State via Apple MDM [InstalledApplicationList / ManagedApplicationList]; Host Status via Apple MDM [DeviceInformation / SecurityInfo / ProfileList / restrictions and compliance queries]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.

References

  1. P Shunk, K Balaam. (2021, October 28). Rooting Malware Makes a Comeback: Lookout Discovers Global Campaign. Retrieved February 6, 2023.
  2. Matt Apuzzo and Michael S. Schmidt. (2016, November 15). Secret Back Door in Some U.S. Phones Sent Data to China, Analysts Say. Retrieved February 6, 2017.
  3. Lukas Stefanko. (2023, May 23). Android app breaking bad: From legitimate screen recording to file exfiltration within a year. Retrieved December 18, 2023.
  4. Costin Raiu, Denis Maslennikov, Kurt Baumgartner. (2013, March 26). Android Trojan Found in Targeted Attack. Retrieved December 23, 2016.
  5. Lookout. (2016, May 25). 5 active mobile threats spoofing enterprise apps. Retrieved December 19, 2016.
  6. Dela Paz, R. (2016, October 21). BITTER: a targeted attack against Pakistan. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
  7. Kyle Schmittle, Alemdar Islamoglu, Paul Shunk, Justin Albrecht. (2023, April 27). Lookout Discovers Android Spyware Tied to Iranian Police Targeting Minorities: BouldSpy. Retrieved July 21, 2023.
  8. Stefanko, L. (2023, January 10). StrongPity espionage campaign targeting Android users. Retrieved January 31, 2023.
  9. T. Bao, J. Lu. (2020, April 14). Coronavirus Update App Leads to Project Spy Android and iOS Spyware. Retrieved April 24, 2020.
  10. Albrecht, J., Islamoglu, A. (2025, July 21). Lookout Discovers Iranian APT MuddyWater Leveraging DCHSpy During Israel-Iran Conflict . Retrieved September 19, 2025.
  11. EnkiWhiteHat. (2025, December 16). Kimsuky Distributing Malicious Mobile App via QR Code. Retrieved January 8, 2026.
  12. Kim, H., S2W TALON. (2025, March 13). Detailed Analysis of DocSwap Malware Disguised as Security Document Viewer. Retrieved January 12, 2026.
  13. A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.
  14. Cyble. (2022, October 27). Drinik Malware Returns With Advanced Capabilities Targeting Indian Taxpayers. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  15. Viral Gandhi. (2017, January 12). Super Mario Run Malware #2 – DroidJack RAT. Retrieved January 20, 2017.
  16. B. Toulas. (2022, March 12). Android malware Escobar steals your Google Authenticator MFA codes. Retrieved September 28, 2023.
  17. Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  18. Igor Golovin. (2022, April 11). Fakecalls: a talking Trojan. Retrieved July 21, 2023.
  19. Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  20. E. Xu, G. Guo. (2019, June 28). Mobile Cyberespionage Campaign ‘Bouncing Golf’ Affects Middle East. Retrieved January 27, 2020.
  21. A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
  22. Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023.
  1. I. Beer. (2019, August 29). Implant Teardown. Retrieved June 2, 2020.
  2. Melikov, D. (2024, April 11). LightSpy Returns: Renewed Espionage Campaign Targets Southern Asia, Possibly India. Retrieved January 14, 2025.
  3. ThreatFabric. (2023, October 2). LightSpy mAPT Mobile Payment System Attack. Retrieved January 17, 2025.
  4. ThreatFabric. (2024, October 29). LightSpy: Implant for iOS. Retrieved January 30, 2025.
  5. Shoshin, P. (2020, March 27). LightSpy spyware targets iPhone users in Hong Kong. Retrieved February 12, 2025.
  6. Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy's iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025.
  7. Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019.
  8. Mike Murray. (2017, April 3). Pegasus for Android: the other side of the story emerges. Retrieved April 16, 2017.
  9. Lookout. (2016). Technical Analysis of Pegasus Spyware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
  10. Gupta, N. (2022, October 5). We Smell A RatMilad Android Spyware. Retrieved August 27, 2025.
  11. J. Chandraiah. (2018, July 23). Red Alert 2.0: Android Trojan targets security-seekers. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  12. O'Donnell, L. (2020, September 30). Android Spyware Variant Snoops on WhatsApp, Telegram Messages. Retrieved January 10, 2025.
  13. Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
  14. Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018.
  15. Felipe Naves, Andrew Conway, W. Stuart Jones, Adam McNeil . (2021, September 23). TangleBot: New Advanced SMS Malware Targets Mobile Users Across U.S. and Canada with COVID-19 Lures. Retrieved February 28, 2023.
  16. S. Desai. (2020, September 8). TikTok Spyware. Retrieved January 5, 2021.
  17. Stefanko, L. (2024, February 1). VajraSpy: A Patchwork of espionage apps. Retrieved October 27, 2025.
  18. Dhanalakshmi. (2022, April 19). VajraSpy – An Android RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2025.
  19. GReAT. (2019, June 26). ViceLeaker Operation: mobile espionage targeting Middle East. Retrieved November 21, 2019.
  20. M. Flossman. (2017, February 16). ViperRAT: The mobile APT targeting the Israeli Defense Force that should be on your radar. Retrieved September 11, 2020.
  21. W. Mercer, P. Rascagneres, V. Ventura. (2020, May 19). The wolf is back... . Retrieved July 20, 2020.