Adversaries may target and collect data from local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, or local databases. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes.
Adversaries may do this using Command-Line Interface or Scripting techniques to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1000 | ACAD/Medre.A |
ACAD/Medre.A collects information related to the AutoCAD application. The worm collects AutoCAD (*.dwg) files with drawings from infected systems. [1] |
| S0038 | Duqu |
Duqu downloads additional modules for the collection of data from local systems. The modules are named: infostealer 1, infostealer 2 and reconnaissance.[2] |
| S0143 | Flame |
Flame has built-in modules to gather information from compromised computers. [3] |
| ID | Asset |
|---|---|
| A0008 | Application Server |
| A0007 | Control Server |
| A0006 | Data Historian |
| A0016 | Firewall |
| A0002 | Human-Machine Interface (HMI) |
| A0012 | Jump Host |
| A0015 | Switch |
| A0001 | Workstation |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M0803 | Data Loss Prevention |
Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted. |
| M0941 | Encrypt Sensitive Information |
Information which is sensitive to the operation and architecture of the process environment may be encrypted to ensure confidentiality and restrict access to only those who need to know. [4] [5] |
| M0922 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Protect files stored locally with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to interact and collect information from the local system. [4] [5] |
| M0917 | User Training |
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored on local systems. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0749 | Detection of Data from Local System | AN1881 |
Monitor Windows Security Event ID 4663 on explicitly audited ICS data paths and correlate repeated ReadData/ListDirectory access across multiple sensitive files or directories by an account/process outside the approved engineering, backup, or application baseline. This requires Object Access auditing and SACLs on the monitored paths; Sysmon does not provide generic file-read telemetry. Alert when the bulk-read pattern occurs outside an approved backup/export window or is followed by staging, compression, or network transfer. |
| AN2137 |
Real-time monitoring identifies a Linux process performing sequential reads across multiple ICS configuration or data paths by a UID outside approved backup, engineering, or vendor-application accounts. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity. |
||
| AN2174 |
Real-time monitoring identifies large outbound data transfers from Industrial Control System (ICS) server Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to destinations outside the approved ICS zone, following a pattern of bulk reads from engineering document stores or historian databases. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity. |
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| AN2244 |
Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol sessions that bulk-read configuration data, program blocks, or data record objects from field devices -- function code sequences retrieving entire data dictionaries rather than operational process values -- from a source with no prior history of configuration-read sessions. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity. |