Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name, location, or appearance of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1225 | CherryBlos |
CherryBlos has displayed masqueraded wallet applications if the EnabledUIMode field is set to |
| S9004 | Crocodilus |
Crocodilus has masqueraded as legitimate applications to include applications related to financial institutions, cryptocurrency, gambling, browser updates and occasionally geo-specific themes.[2] |
| S1208 | FjordPhantom |
FjordPhantom has masqueraded as legitimate banking applications.[3] |
| S1185 | LightSpy |
LightSpy has masqueraded a Mach-O executable as a png file.[4][5] |
| S9006 | VajraSpy |
VajraSpy has masqueraded as messaging and news applications.[6][7] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1011 | User Guidance |
Users should be encouraged to only install apps from authorized app stores, which are less likely to contain malicious repackaged apps. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0715 | Detection of Masquerading | AN1843 |
For Android, detect Masquerading from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; File Creation via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: app binary written to device storage as part of install — confirms impersonating app is being persisted]; File Metadata via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: installed app package_name Levenshtein distance <= $NameDistanceThreshold$ to entry in $KnownAppCatalog$]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone. |
| AN1844 |
For iOS, detect Masquerading by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; File Metadata via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: bundle_id LIKE $KnownSystemNamespace$]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone. |