A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs.
Input Injection can be achieved using any of the following methods:
GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK (programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.[2]| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1094 | BRATA |
BRATA can insert a given string of text into a data field. BRATA can abuse the Accessibility Service to interact with other installed applications and inject screen taps to grant permissions.[4][5] |
| S0480 | Cerberus |
Cerberus can inject input to grant itself additional permissions without user interaction and to prevent application removal.[6][7] |
| S9004 | Crocodilus |
Crocodilus has the ability to perform clicks, swipes (left, right, up and down) on the screen and actions such as "Back," "Home," and "Menu."[8] |
| S0479 | DEFENSOR ID |
DEFENSOR ID can abuse the accessibility service to perform actions on behalf of the user, including launching attacker-specified applications to steal data.[9] |
| S0423 | Ginp |
Ginp can inject input to make itself the default SMS handler.[10] |
| S1231 | GodFather |
GodFather has abused the Accessibility Service to mimic victims’ actions and to redirect victims to its StubActivity when the victims attempt to use the original, legitimate banking application.[11] |
| S0406 | Gustuff |
Gustuff injects the global action |
| S0485 | Mandrake |
Mandrake abuses the accessibility service to prevent removing administrator permissions, accessibility permissions, and to set itself as the default SMS handler.[12] |
| S0403 | Riltok |
Riltok injects input to set itself as the default SMS handler by clicking the appropriate places on the screen. It can also close or minimize targeted antivirus applications and the device security settings screen.[13] |
| S1062 | S.O.V.A. | |
| S1055 | SharkBot |
SharkBot can use input injection via Accessibility Services to simulate user touch inputs, prevent applications from opening, change device settings, and bypass MFA protections.[15] |
| S0545 | TERRACOTTA |
TERRACOTTA can inject clicks to launch applications, share posts on social media, and interact with WebViews to perform fraudulent actions.[16] |
| S0427 | TrickMo |
TrickMo can inject input to set itself as the default SMS handler, and to automatically click through pop-ups without giving the user any time to react.[17] |
| S0494 | Zen |
Zen can simulate user clicks on ads and system prompts to create new Google accounts.[18] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1012 | Enterprise Policy |
An EMM/MDM can use the Android |
| M1011 | User Guidance |
Users should be warned against granting access to accessibility features, and to carefully scrutinize applications that request this dangerous permission. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0612 | Detection of Input Injection | AN1666 |
The defender correlates Android accessibility or UI-automation-capable behavior from an app identity with injected user-interface actions occurring on behalf of the user in another foreground application. The strongest Android evidence is accessibility-enabled or similarly privileged app behavior that triggers programmatic clicks, global actions, or text insertion into another app's active UI, especially when those actions occur without matching user touch interaction, while the injecting app is backgrounded or foreground-service-only, or when the target foreground app belongs to a sensitive category such as banking, payments, identity, communications, or enterprise access. The detection is strengthened when the injected input sequence is followed by target-app navigation, form submission, transaction progression, or network activity from the target context. |