Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands.
Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states.
A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0028 | 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack |
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team scheduled the uninterruptable power supplies (UPS) to shutdown data and telephone servers via the UPS management interface. [1][2] |
| C0063 | 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks |
During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries corrupted the firmware in the Hitachi RTUs resulting in a fault that triggered a reboot loop.[3] |
| S0604 | Industroyer |
The Industroyer SIPROTEC DoS module exploits the CVE-2015-5374 vulnerability in order to render a Siemens SIPROTEC device unresponsive. While the vulnerability does not directly cause the restart or shutdown of the device, the device must be restarted manually before it can resume operations. [4] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M0801 | Access Management |
All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherently provide strong authentication and authorization functions. |
| M0800 | Authorization Enforcement |
All field controllers should restrict the modification of programs to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. |
| M0802 | Communication Authenticity |
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs). |
| M0942 | Disable or Remove Feature or Program |
Ensure remote commands that enable device shutdown are disabled if they are not necessary. Examples include DNP3's 0x0D function code or unnecessary device management functions. |
| M0937 | Filter Network Traffic |
Application denylists can be used to block automation protocol functions used to initiate device shutdowns or restarts, such as DNP3's 0x0D function code, or vulnerabilities that can be used to trigger device shutdowns (e.g., CVE-2014-9195, CVE-2015-5374). |
| M0804 | Human User Authentication |
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. |
| M0807 | Network Allowlists |
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [5] |
| M0930 | Network Segmentation |
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [5] |
| M0813 | Software Process and Device Authentication |
Authenticate connections from software and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0801 | Detection of Device Restart/Shutdown | AN1933 |
Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol restart/reset command directed at a field device from a source not in the approved engineering workstation list, particularly where multiple devices receive restart commands within a short window. Documented precedent: Industroyer exploited CVE-2015-5374 via a crafted 18-byte User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet to port 50000 on Siemens SIPROTEC relays. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |
| AN2157 |
Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux engineering tool issuing device restart commands outside a scheduled maintenance window, from a User Identifier (UID) not in the approved engineer list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |
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| AN2187 |
Real-time monitoring identifies Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) SET commands to power Management Information Base (MIB) restart Object Identifiers (OIDs) or Command Line Interface (CLI) reload commands from a source not in the approved Network Management System (NMS) Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR). OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |
||
| AN2260 |
Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) vendor engineering software initiating a device restart command from a Windows host outside a scheduled maintenance window. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |