| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1692.001 | Command Message |
| T1692.002 | Reporting Message |
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values.
If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, they can impact the control system in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the process is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors are occurring in order to distract them from the actual source of a problem.[1]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0020 | Maroochy Water Breach |
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer.[2] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M0802 | Communication Authenticity |
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs). |
| M0937 | Filter Network Traffic |
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporting messages. |
| M0807 | Network Allowlists |
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations.[3] |
| M0930 | Network Segmentation |
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment.[4][5][3][6] |
| M0813 | Software Process and Device Authentication |
Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0746 | Detection of Spoof Reporting Message | AN1879 |
Real-time monitoring identifies a process on an Industrial Control System (ICS) Windows host injecting spoofed reporting messages into the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) data path -- Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) data change notifications with fabricated values, or historian tag writes that override device-sourced values -- from a process that is not the recognized data acquisition process. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |
| AN2136 |
Real-time monitoring identifies a Linux process generating Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol unsolicited responses or publishing Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) data changes for device addresses it does not own, from a User Identifier (UID) not associated with the authorized data acquisition service. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |
||
| AN2215 |
Real-time monitoring cross-correlates a field device's reported telemetry against an independent secondary measurement, identifying cases where the reported value diverges from the independent reading while the device's network-layer identity shows a MAC mismatch against its enrolled hardware address. Spoofed reporting messages are, by definition, designed to look protocol-valid. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |
||
| AN2236 |
Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) unsolicited response messages such as Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3) unsolicited or Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) frames arriving from Internet Protocol (IP) or Media Access Control (MAC) addresses that do not match the enrolled device for those data points. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures. |