Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Access to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1061 | AbstractEmu |
AbstractEmu can collect files from or inspect the device’s filesystem.[1] |
| S1095 | AhRat |
AhRat can find and exfiltrate files with certain extensions, such as .jpg, .mp4, .html, .docx, and .pdf.[2] |
| S0422 | Anubis |
Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage.[3][4] |
| S1215 | Binary Validator |
Binary Validator has searched for and has deleted the malicious iMessage attachment used in the initial access phase in various databases.[5] |
| S1079 | BOULDSPY |
BOULDSPY can access browser history and bookmarks, and can list all files and folders on the device.[6] |
| S1094 | BRATA |
BRATA has collected account information from compromised devices.[7] |
| S0655 | BusyGasper |
BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history.[8] |
| S1083 | Chameleon | |
| S0555 | CHEMISTGAMES |
CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.[11] |
| S0426 | Concipit1248 |
Concipit1248 can collect device photos.[12] |
| S0425 | Corona Updates |
Corona Updates can collect voice notes, device accounts, and gallery images.[12] |
| S1243 | DCHSpy |
DCHSpy has collected files of interest on the device, including WhatsApp files.[13] |
| S0301 | Dendroid |
Dendroid can collect the device’s photos, browser history, bookmarks, and accounts stored on the device.[14] |
| S0505 | Desert Scorpion |
Desert Scorpion can collect attacker-specified files, including files located on external storage.[15] |
| S9005 | DocSwap |
DocSwap has checked for the |
| S0550 | DoubleAgent |
DoubleAgent has collected files from the infected device.[18] |
| S1054 | Drinik |
Drinik can request the |
| S1092 | Escobar |
Escobar can collect sensitive information, such as Google Authenticator codes.[20] |
| S0507 | eSurv | |
| S0405 | Exodus |
Exodus Two can extract information on pictures from the Gallery, Chrome and SBrowser bookmarks, and the connected WiFi network's password.[22] |
| S1080 | Fakecalls |
Fakecalls can access and exfiltrate files, such as photos or video.[23] |
| S0408 | FlexiSpy |
FlexiSpy can monitor device photos and can also access browser history and bookmarks.[24] |
| S0577 | FrozenCell |
FrozenCell has retrieved device images for exfiltration.[25] |
| S0423 | Ginp | |
| S0535 | Golden Cup |
Golden Cup can collect images, videos, and attacker-specified files.[27] |
| S0551 | GoldenEagle |
GoldenEagle has retrieved .doc, .txt, .gif, .apk, .jpg, .png, .mp3, and .db files from external storage.[18] |
| S0421 | GolfSpy |
GolfSpy can collect local accounts on the device, pictures, bookmarks/histories of the default browser, and files stored on the SD card. GolfSpy can list image, audio, video, and other files stored on the device. GolfSpy can copy arbitrary files from the device.[28] |
| S0290 | Gooligan |
Gooligan steals authentication tokens that can be used to access data from multiple Google applications.[29] |
| S0536 | GPlayed | |
| S0406 | Gustuff |
Gustuff can capture files and photos from the compromised device.[31] |
| S0544 | HenBox |
HenBox can steal data from various sources, including chat, communication, and social media apps.[32] |
| S1077 | Hornbill | |
| S0463 | INSOMNIA |
INSOMNIA can collect application database files, including Gmail, Hangouts, device photos, and container directories of third-party apps.[34] |
| S1185 | LightSpy |
LightSpy has collected and exfiltrated files from messaging applications, such as Telegram, QQ, WeChat, and Whatsapp, and browser history from Chrome and Safari.[35][36][37][38][39] |
| S0407 | Monokle |
Monokle can retrieve the salt used when storing the user’s password, aiding an adversary in computing the user’s plaintext password/PIN from the stored password hash. Monokle can also capture the user’s dictionary, user-defined shortcuts, and browser history, enabling profiling of the user and their activities.[40] |
| C0016 | Operation Dust Storm |
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Android backdoors capable of exfiltrating specific files directly from the infected devices.[41] |
| C0054 | Operation Triangulation |
During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors stole data from SQLite databases.[5] |
| S1126 | Phenakite |
Phenakite can collect and exfiltrate WhatsApp media, photos and files with specific extensions, such as .pdf and .doc.[42] |
| S1241 | RatMilad |
RatMilad has listed files and pictures on the device starting from |
| S0295 | RCSAndroid |
RCSAndroid can collect passwords for Wi-Fi networks and online accounts, including Skype, Facebook, Twitter, Google, WhatsApp, Mail, and LinkedIn.[44] |
| S0549 | SilkBean |
SilkBean can retrieve files from external storage and can collect browser data.[18] |
| S1195 | SpyC23 |
SpyC23 can collect and exfiltrate files with specific extensions, such as .pdf, doc.[45] |
| S0305 | SpyNote RAT |
SpyNote RAT can copy files from the device to the C2 server.[46] |
| S0328 | Stealth Mango |
Stealth Mango collected and exfiltrated data from the device, including sensitive letters/documents, stored photos, and stored audio files.[47] |
| S1082 | Sunbird | |
| S0329 | Tangelo | |
| S1069 | TangleBot |
TangleBot can request permission to view files and media.[48] |
| S0558 | Tiktok Pro |
Tiktok Pro can collect device photos and credentials from other applications.[49] |
| S1216 | TriangleDB |
TriangleDB has collected and exfiltrated files.[50] |
| S0427 | TrickMo | |
| S9006 | VajraSpy |
VajraSpy has collected files with specific extensions, such as .txt, .jpg, .Om4a, .aac and .opus, before exfiltration.[52] VajraSpy has also requested for |
| S0418 | ViceLeaker |
ViceLeaker can copy arbitrary files from the device to the C2 server, can exfiltrate browsing history, can exfiltrate the SD card structure, and can exfiltrate pictures as the user takes them.[54][55] |
| S0506 | ViperRAT |
ViperRAT can collect device photos, PDF documents, Office documents, browser history, and browser bookmarks.[56] |
| G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has exfiltrated local account data and calendar information as part of Operation ROCK.[57] |
| S0489 | WolfRAT |
WolfRAT can collect user account, photos, browser history, and arbitrary files.[58] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0713 | Detection of Data from Local System | AN1840 |
For Android, detect Data from Local System from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate Application Permission via Android Enterprise DPC / Application Vetting [DevicePolicyManager.getPermissionGrantState(); PackageManager manifest/requested-permission review]; File Access via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App reads files across $MinDirectoryCount$+ distinct parent directories with file_read_count > $FileReadRateThreshold$ within $DataCollectionWindow$ in background or low-interaction state — bulk cross-directory read is the collection signal]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App invokes ContentResolver or SAF (Storage Access Framework) queries across multiple user-data paths outside its own sandbox in background state]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone. |
| AN1841 |
For iOS, detect Data from Local System primarily during application vetting or controlled analysis rather than assuming a live device SOC feed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; File Access via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App reads multiple files from Photos library, Files provider, or iCloud Drive in background or lock-adjacent state exceeding $FileReadRateThreshold$ within $DataCollectionWindow$]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: Managed app accesses broad local data scope without user-initiated document picker interaction on supervised device]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone. |