Adversaries may direct victims to download malicious applications via ways that avoid an authorized application store (e.g. Google Play Store or Apple App Store). For example, victims may be directed to downloading a malicious APK directly from a domain. Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized application store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons.
Delivery methods for malicious applications include:
Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.[4]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0440 | Agent Smith |
Agent Smith has been distributed through the 9apps application store.[5] |
| S0304 | Android/Chuli.A |
Android/Chuli.A has been delivered via a spearphishing message containing a malicious Android application as an attachment.[6] |
| S0524 | AndroidOS/MalLocker.B |
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has been distributed using direct download links.[7] |
| S0422 | Anubis |
Anubis has been distributed via a phishing link in an email.[8] |
| S0540 | Asacub |
Asacub has been delivered via phishing SMS messages that contain a link to a website that hosts the malicious APK file.[9] |
| G0097 | Bouncing Golf |
Bouncing Golf has delivered GolfSpy via a hosted application binary advertised on social media.[10] |
| S0432 | Bread |
Bread has the ability to install additional applications.[11] |
| S0480 | Cerberus |
Cerberus has been delivered to the victim device via websites that prompt the user to "[…] install Adobe Flash Player," downloading the malicious APK to the device.[12] |
| G0070 | Dark Caracal |
Dark Caracal has distributed Pallas via trojanized applications hosted on watering hole websites.[13] |
| S0507 | eSurv |
eSurv has been distributed via phishing websites with geo-restrictions that allow access to only Italian and Turkmenistani mobile carriers. eSurv also has the ability to install applications via malicious iOS provisioning profiles containing the developer’s certificate.[14] |
| S0522 | Exobot |
Exobot has been distributed using direct download links.[15] |
| S0509 | FakeSpy |
FakeSpy has been distributed via direct download links in SMS phishing messages.[16] |
| S0421 | GolfSpy |
GolfSpy has the ability to install adversary-specified applications.[10] |
| S0406 | Gustuff |
Gustuff has been distributed via SMS phishing messages to phone numbers exfiltrated from compromised devices’ contact lists.[17] |
| S0544 | HenBox |
HenBox has been distributed via third-party application stores.[18] |
| S0317 | Marcher |
Marcher has been delivered via a link sent by SMS or email, including instructions advising the user to modify their Android device security settings to enable applications to be installed from "Unknown Sources."[19] |
| S0303 | MazarBOT |
MazarBOT has been delivered via an unsolicited text message containing a link to a web download URI.[20] |
| S9040 | NGate |
NGate has been distributed via files[.]fm and through fake websites that mimic legitimate services, such as banking websites and Rio de Prêmios, a lottery website.[21][22][23] |
| S0399 | Pallas |
Pallas has the ability to download and install attacker-specified applications.[13] |
| S0539 | Red Alert 2.0 |
Red Alert 2.0 has been distributed via webpages designed to look like the Play Store.[24] |
| S0326 | RedDrop |
RedDrop has used advertisements or other links within websites to encourage users to download the malicious applications using a complex content distribution network (CDN) and series of network redirects. RedDrop also downloads additional components (APKs, JAR files) from different C2 servers.[25] |
| S0403 | Riltok |
Riltok has been distributed via phishing SMS messages from infected devices.[26] |
| S0411 | Rotexy |
Rotexy has been distributed through phishing links sent in SMS messages as |
| S0313 | RuMMS |
RuMMS has been delivered via an SMS message containing a link to an APK (Android application package).[28] |
| S0419 | SimBad |
SimBad has the ability to install adversary-specified applications.[29] |
| S0491 | StrongPity |
StrongPity has been distributed via a domain containing the word "dutch" and via a website impersonating the legitimate website shagle[.]com.[30] |
| S0558 | Tiktok Pro |
Tiktok Pro has been distributed via direct download on third party websites, with the link sent in phishing SMS messages.[31] |
| S0302 | Twitoor |
Twitoor has the ability to install adversary-specified applications.[32] |
| S0418 | ViceLeaker |
ViceLeaker has been primarily distributed via Telegram and WhatsApp messages.[33] |
| S0506 | ViperRAT |
ViperRAT has been distributed through third party websites.[34] |
| G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has distributed malicious applications via their own websites during Operation BULL.[35] |
| S0318 | XLoader for Android |
XLoader for Android has been distributed via phishing websites.[36] |
| S0490 | XLoader for iOS |
XLoader for iOS has been distributed via phishing SMS messages, which link to a malicious website hosting a device profile.[36] |
| S0311 | YiSpecter |
YiSpecter has been signed with iOS enterprise certificates issued by Apple to allow the malicious applications to be installed as enterprise applications on non-jailbroken iOS devices.[37] |
| S0287 | ZergHelper |
ZergHelper has abused enterprise and personal certificates to sign and distribute applications.[38] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.