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Audio Capture

Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information.

Android and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user.

On Android devices, applications must hold the RECORD_AUDIO permission to access the microphone or the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output.[1] However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT permission, adversaries may pass the MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL constant to MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink.[2]

On iOS devices, applications must include the NSMicrophoneUsageDescription key in their Info.plist file to access the microphone.[3]

ID: T1429
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access
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Tactic: Collection
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Platforms: Android, iOS
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MTC ID: APP-19
Version: 3.1
Created: 25 October 2017
Last Modified: 12 May 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1061 AbstractEmu

AbstractEmu can grant itself microphone permissions.[4]
S1095 AhRat

AhRat can record audio using a device’s microphone.[5]
S0292 AndroRAT

AndroRAT gathers audio from the microphone.[6][7]

S0422 Anubis

Anubis can record phone calls and audio.[8]
S1079 BOULDSPY

BOULDSPY can access a device’s microphone to record audio, as well as cell and VoIP application calls.[9]
S0655 BusyGasper

BusyGasper can record audio.[10]
C0033 C0033

During C0033, PROMETHIUM used StrongPity to record phone calls.[11]

S0529 CarbonSteal

CarbonSteal can remotely capture device audio.[12]
S0425 Corona Updates

Corona Updates can record MP4 files and monitor calls.[13]
S1243 DCHSpy

DCHSpy has captured audio from the device by taking control of the microphone.[14]

S0301 Dendroid

Dendroid can record audio and outgoing calls.[15]
S0505 Desert Scorpion

Desert Scorpion can record audio from phone calls and the device microphone.[16]
S9005 DocSwap

DocSwap has the ability to start and stop audio recording.[17][18]

S0550 DoubleAgent

DoubleAgent has captured audio and can record phone calls.[12]
S0320 DroidJack

DroidJack is capable of recording device phone calls.[19]
S1092 Escobar

Escobar can record audio from the device’s microphone.[20]
S0507 eSurv

eSurv can record audio.[21]
S0405 Exodus

Exodus Two can record audio from the compromised device's microphone and can record call audio in 3GP format.[22]

S1080 Fakecalls

Fakecalls can turn on a device’s microphone to capture audio.[23]
S0182 FinFisher

FinFisher uses the device microphone to record phone conversations.[24]
S0408 FlexiSpy

FlexiSpy can record both incoming and outgoing phone calls, as well as microphone audio.[25]
S0577 FrozenCell

FrozenCell has recorded calls.[26]
S1231 GodFather

GodFather has requested for the RECORD_AUDIO permission to record audio with the microphone.[27]

S0535 Golden Cup

Golden Cup can record audio from the microphone and phone calls.[28]

S0551 GoldenEagle

GoldenEagle has recorded calls and environment audio in .amr format.[12]
S0421 GolfSpy

GolfSpy can record audio and phone calls.[29]
S0544 HenBox

HenBox can access the device’s microphone.[30]
S1128 HilalRAT

HilalRAT can activate a device’s microphone.[31]
S1077 Hornbill

Hornbill can record environmental and call audio.[32]
S1185 LightSpy

LightSpy has captured environment audio, phone calls and Voice over IP (VoIP) calls.[33][34][35][36][37]
S0407 Monokle

Monokle can record audio from the device's microphone and can record phone calls, specifying the output audio quality.[38]
C0054 Operation Triangulation

During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors used a microphone-recording module.[39]

S0399 Pallas

Pallas captures audio from the device microphone.[24]
S0316 Pegasus for Android

Pegasus for Android has the ability to record device audio.[40]
S0289 Pegasus for iOS

Pegasus for iOS has the ability to record audio.[41]
S1126 Phenakite

Phenakite can record phone calls.[42]
S1241 RatMilad

RatMilad has captured audio from the device.[43]

S0295 RCSAndroid

RCSAndroid can record audio using the device microphone.[44]
S0326 RedDrop

RedDrop captures live recordings of the device's surroundings.[45]
S0327 Skygofree

Skygofree can record audio via the microphone when an infected device is in a specified location.[46]
S1195 SpyC23

SpyC23 can record phone calls and audio.[47][48][49][50][51]
S0324 SpyDealer

SpyDealer can record phone calls and surrounding audio.[52]
S0305 SpyNote RAT

SpyNote RAT can activate the victim's microphone.[53]
S0328 Stealth Mango

Stealth Mango can record audio using the device microphone.[54]
S1082 Sunbird

Sunbird can record environmental and call audio.[32]
S0329 Tangelo

Tangelo contains functionality to record calls as well as the victim device's environment.[54]
S1069 TangleBot

TangleBot can record audio using the device microphone.[55]
S0558 Tiktok Pro

Tiktok Pro can capture audio from the device’s microphone and can record phone calls.[56]
S9006 VajraSpy

VajraSpy has recorded surrounding audio and phone calls from WhatsApp, WhatsApp Business, Signal, and Telegram by requesting android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO.[57][58]

S0418 ViceLeaker

ViceLeaker can record audio from the device’s microphone and can record phone calls together with the caller ID.[59][60]
S0506 ViperRAT

ViperRAT can collect and record audio content.[61]
G0112 Windshift

Windshift has included phone call and audio recording capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[62]
S0489 WolfRAT

WolfRAT can record call audio.[63]
S0318 XLoader for Android

XLoader for Android covertly records phone calls.[64]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1006 Use Recent OS Version

Android 9 and above restricts access to microphone, camera, and other sensors from background applications.[65]

M1011 User Guidance

Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to microphone or audio output.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0673 Detection of Audio Capture AN1772

For Android, detect Audio Capture by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: AudioRecord.startRecording() or MediaRecorder.start() called by app NOT IN $AudioAllowList$]; File Creation via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: open() with O_CREAT for file with audio MIME type (audio/mp4, audio/aac, audio/3gpp) in /data/data//files/ within $AudioCaptureWindow$ of recording API start]; Network Traffic Flow via Android Enterprise Network Logging / Enterprise VPN [DevicePolicyManager.retrieveNetworkLogs(): DnsEvent / ConnectEvent; VPN flow metadata]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.
AN1773

For iOS, detect Audio Capture by correlating analyst-visible device/network evidence and management state; use streaming or batched telemetry only where the documented collector is deployed. Correlate Application Permission via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]; Network Traffic Flow via Apple Network Extension / Enterprise VPN [NEFilterFlow / per-app VPN / secure-web-gateway flow metadata]; Permissions Request via Application Vetting [Code-signing entitlements and Info.plist privacy usage-description keys]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.

References

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