Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases in the process environment, as well as databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.[1]
Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS.
In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string SCAD*, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information. [2]
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0038 | Duqu |
Duqu downloads additional modules for the collection of data in information repositories, including the Infostealer 2 module that can access data from Windows Shares.[3] |
| ID | Asset |
|---|---|
| A0007 | Control Server |
| A0006 | Data Historian |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M0947 | Audit |
Consider periodic reviews of accounts and privileges for critical and sensitive repositories. |
| M0941 | Encrypt Sensitive Information |
Information which is sensitive to the operation and architecture of the process environment may be encrypted to ensure confidentiality and restrict access to only those who need to know. [4] [5] |
| M0926 | Privileged Account Management |
Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit the information that may be exposed or collected by malicious users or software. [5] |
| M0922 | Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Protect files with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to interact and collect information from databases. [4] [5] |
| M0918 | User Account Management |
Ensure users and user groups have appropriate permissions for their roles through Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls to prevent misuse. Implement user accounts for each individual that may access the repositories for role enforcement and non-repudiation of actions. |
| M0917 | User Training |
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in repositories. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0754 | Detection of Data from Information Repositories | AN1886 |
Real-time monitoring identifies access to Industrial Control System (ICS) documentation repositories by an account or session context not associated with documented engineering roles, immediately followed by bulk file access or archive creation. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity. |
| AN2114 |
Real-time monitoring identifies bulk file access on a Linux-hosted Industrial Control System (ICS) documentation repository (piping and instrumentation diagram stores, configuration archives) by a User Identifier (UID) not associated with documented engineering roles. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity. |
||
| AN2247 |
Real-time monitoring identifies Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol sessions that bulk-read configuration data, program blocks, or data record objects from field devices, covering address ranges never queried by legitimate Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), suggesting systematic extraction of ICS design documentation. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity. |