Monitor Process State

Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.

ID: T0801
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
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Tactic: Collection
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Platforms: Embedded, Linux, Network Devices, Windows
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 May 2020
Last Modified: 13 October 2026

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1165 FrostyGoop

FrostyGoop can read data from holding registers via Modbus communication.[1]

S0604 Industroyer

Industroyer's OPC and IEC 61850 protocol modules include the ability to send stVal requests to read the status of operational variables. [2]

S1072 Industroyer2

Industroyer2 uses a General Interrogation command to monitor the device’s Information Object Addresses (IOAs) and their IO state values.[3]

S0603 Stuxnet

Stuxnet examines fields recorded by the DP_RECV monitor to determine if the target system is in a particular state of operation. [4]

Targeted Assets

ID Asset
A0007 Control Server
A0009 Data Gateway
A0006 Data Historian
A0017 Distributed Control System (DCS) Controller
A0013 Field I/O
A0002 Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
A0005 Intelligent Electronic Device (IED)
A0018 Programmable Automation Controller (PAC)
A0003 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)
A0004 Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
A0010 Safety Controller

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M0816 Mitigation Limited or Not Effective

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0727 Detection of Monitor Process State AN1860

Real-time network monitoring identifies a source issuing read-only Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol requests to multiple field devices at a polling rate exceeding the legitimate Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) baseline, from a source not in the approved control server allowlist. Because the action is read-only, source-identity and rate deviation are the only available distinguishing signals. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

AN2125

Real-time monitoring identifies a scripting interpreter or custom binary on an Industrial Control System (ICS) Linux asset making sustained, high-frequency Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol read connections to field device IPs, from a User Identifier (UID) not associated with the recognized historian or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) service account. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

AN2169

Real-time monitoring identifies NetFlow showing a host generating an anomalously high volume of short-duration flows to multiple field device IPs at regular intervals, from a source not in the approved Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) server list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

AN2206

Real-time monitoring identifies a process on an Industrial Control System (ICS) Windows host querying device operating state or process values via vendor Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) at a frequency or scope exceeding documented Human-Machine Interface (HMI) refresh behavior, from a process not in the recognized HMI/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) application list. OT operational-fidelity gate: Do not alert on novelty, scan/read volume, or enumeration alone. Alert when the source role is not authorized for discovery/polling and the target scope, address/tag range, protocol, or rate deviates from the established operational baseline. Suppress normal SCADA/HMI/historian polling, commissioning, asset inventory, backup, diagnostics, and approved engineering activity.

References