Real-time monitoring identifies an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol mode-change command targeting a field device from a source not in the approved engineering workstation list, where the transition is not immediately followed by a corresponding operator acknowledgment. Documented in Triton (the Tricon controller had to be placed in PROGRAM mode before the attack could inject its payload). OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when the action is not attributable to an authorized operator/engineering source for the specific target and function, and it is either outside an approved change/maintenance window or lacks matching change-control context; where telemetry permits, require corroborating device, configuration, or process-state effect. Suppress activity that fully matches approved maintenance, commissioning, failover, recovery, or tested control procedures.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Device Alarm (DC0108) | operationaldb:AlarmEvent | device mode-change alarm generated without corresponding operator_id entry within mode change ack window |
| Network Traffic Content (DC0085) | NSM:Content | mode-change service from source not in engineering workstation list outside change control window |
| Application Log Content (DC0038) | engineeringworkstation:ApplicationLog | mode-change session logged without corresponding change ticket reference |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| ChangeControlWindow | Scheduled maintenance periods during which mode changes are authorized. |
| EngineeringWorkstationList | IP allowlist of workstations authorized to issue mode-change commands. |
| ModeChangeAckWindow | Time window within which a legitimate operator acknowledgment is expected following a mode-change event. |