Real-time monitoring identifies a process or scheduled task whose displayed name matches a known Industrial Control System (ICS) vendor application but whose on-disk binary hash or file path does not match the vendor-signed baseline. The mismatch -- name says one thing, binary integrity says another -- is the defining signal. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Scheduled Job Creation (DC0001) | WinEventLog:Security | Windows Security Event ID 4698/4702: EventCode=4698 referencing Industrial Control Systems (ICS) vendor binary name from unauthorized process |
| File Metadata (DC0059) | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=11 matching Industrial Control Systems (ICS) vendor binary name in a path outside vendor install paths |
| Process Metadata (DC0034) | WinEventLog:Sysmon | EventCode=1 where image filename matches Industrial Control Systems (ICS) vendor process names but hash not in vendor hash baseline or current directory outside vendor install paths |
| Service Creation (DC0060) | WinEventLog:System | EventCode=7045 where ServiceName/ImagePath references Industrial Control Systems (ICS) vendor application with hash/path mismatch |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| AssetInventoryDeviceTypes | Maintained inventory of expected vendor/product identity strings per enrolled device IP. |
| ICSDaemonNames | List of expected Linux ICS service daemon process names. |
| ICSVendorProcessNames | List of known ICS vendor executable names used as the masquerade-target watchlist. |
| VendorHashBaseline | Cryptographic hash inventory for all legitimate versions of vendor ICS binaries, updated on every patch cycle. |
| VendorInstallPaths | Authorized installation directories for each ICS vendor application. |
Real-time monitoring identifies a process whose executable name matches a known Industrial Control System (ICS) service daemon but whose execution path falls outside the documented vendor installation directories, or whose binary hash does not match the package manager's recorded checksum for that package. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Process Metadata (DC0034) | auditd:SYSCALL | Linux Audit SYSCALL/EXECVE/SOCKADDR records (configured audit rule): execve where exe basename matches Industrial Control Systems (ICS) daemon names but path outside vendor install paths |
| File Metadata (DC0059) | linux:pkgintegrity | rpm -V/dpkg --verify checksum mismatch for installed Industrial Control Systems (ICS) package binary |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| AssetInventoryDeviceTypes | Maintained inventory of expected vendor/product identity strings per enrolled device IP. |
| ICSDaemonNames | List of expected Linux ICS service daemon process names. |
| ICSVendorProcessNames | List of known ICS vendor executable names used as the masquerade-target watchlist. |
| VendorHashBaseline | Cryptographic hash inventory for all legitimate versions of vendor ICS binaries, updated on every patch cycle. |
| VendorInstallPaths | Authorized installation directories for each ICS vendor application. |
Real-time monitoring identifies an ICS device presenting protocol identity attributes (for example vendor, product, model, or capability identifiers) that conflict with the identity and capabilities recorded for that network address/device in the authorized asset inventory. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Content (DC0085) | NSM:Content | GetIdentity/Identity Object response vendor/product string does not match enrolled asset inventory for device_ip |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| AssetInventoryDeviceTypes | Maintained inventory of expected vendor/product identity strings per enrolled device IP. |
| ICSDaemonNames | List of expected Linux ICS service daemon process names. |
| ICSVendorProcessNames | List of known ICS vendor executable names used as the masquerade-target watchlist. |
| VendorHashBaseline | Cryptographic hash inventory for all legitimate versions of vendor ICS binaries, updated on every patch cycle. |
| VendorInstallPaths | Authorized installation directories for each ICS vendor application. |
Real-time monitoring identifies traffic on an Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol port (e.g., 502, 20000, 44818, etc.) with payload content that does not conform to the expected protocol structure for that port, suggesting non-ICS traffic tunneled over ICS port numbers to evade port-based filtering or blend with expected traffic patterns. OT operational-fidelity gate: Alert only when execution violates an approved signer/hash/path/parent/process or tool allowlist, or originates from an unauthorized user/tool, and is tied to an OT asset or follow-on OT-relevant action. Suppress vendor-signed software, approved engineering utilities, diagnostics, patching, backup, and documented maintenance.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| Network Traffic Content (DC0085) | otids:ProtocolDecoder | Protocol decoder/IDS transaction/signature: exploit-relevant request against ICS remote service from unexpected source, correlated with subsequent endpoint/device anomaly |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| AssetInventoryDeviceTypes | Maintained inventory of expected vendor/product identity strings per enrolled device IP. |
| ICSDaemonNames | List of expected Linux ICS service daemon process names. |
| ICSVendorProcessNames | List of known ICS vendor executable names used as the masquerade-target watchlist. |
| VendorHashBaseline | Cryptographic hash inventory for all legitimate versions of vendor ICS binaries, updated on every patch cycle. |
| VendorInstallPaths | Authorized installation directories for each ICS vendor application. |
| ID | Asset |
|---|---|
| A0001 | Workstation |
| A0002 | Human-Machine Interface (HMI) |
| A0006 | Data Historian |
| A0007 | Control Server |
| A0008 | Application Server |
| A0009 | Data Gateway |
| A0012 | Jump Host |