Detection of Hijack Execution Flow

Technique Detected:  Hijack Execution Flow | T1625

ID: DET0694
Domains: Mobile
Analytics: AN1807
Version: 1.0
Created: 21 October 2025
Last Modified: 12 May 2026

Analytics

AN1807

For Android, detect Hijack Execution Flow from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate File Access via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App loads executable or library from writable external directory (/sdcard/, app cache, /data/local/tmp/) — writable-path library load is exploitable hijack vector]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App loads library or executes component]; Process Creation via Application Vetting / Managed Device Telemetry [App execution triggered with unexpected parent context or via indirect invocation (intent redirect, implicit intent resolution to unexpected handler) — indirect invocation path is the flow hijack confirmation]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.

Log Sources
Data Component Name Channel
File Access (DC0055) mobile:ForensicArtifacts Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App loads executable or library from writable external directory (/sdcard/, app cache, /data/local/tmp/) — writable-path library load is exploitable hijack vector
OS API Execution (DC0021) mobile:DynamicAnalysis Dynamic API/runtime trace: App loads library or executes component
Process Creation (DC0032) mobile:DynamicAnalysis App execution triggered with unexpected parent context or via indirect invocation (intent redirect, implicit intent resolution to unexpected handler) — indirect invocation path is the flow hijack confirmation
Mutable Elements
Field Description
AppInternalPaths Expected library load paths per app: /data/app//lib/, /data/dalvik-cache/. Derive from app package manifest and baseline measurement. Any library loaded from outside these paths is anomalous.
WritablePathList /sdcard/, /data/local/tmp/, /data/data//files/ — directories writable without elevated privilege that are exploitable for library substitution.