For Android, detect Hijack Execution Flow from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate File Access via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App loads executable or library from writable external directory (/sdcard/, app cache, /data/local/tmp/) — writable-path library load is exploitable hijack vector]; OS API Execution via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: App loads library or executes component]; Process Creation via Application Vetting / Managed Device Telemetry [App execution triggered with unexpected parent context or via indirect invocation (intent redirect, implicit intent resolution to unexpected handler) — indirect invocation path is the flow hijack confirmation]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| File Access (DC0055) | mobile:ForensicArtifacts | Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: App loads executable or library from writable external directory (/sdcard/, app cache, /data/local/tmp/) — writable-path library load is exploitable hijack vector |
| OS API Execution (DC0021) | mobile:DynamicAnalysis | Dynamic API/runtime trace: App loads library or executes component |
| Process Creation (DC0032) | mobile:DynamicAnalysis | App execution triggered with unexpected parent context or via indirect invocation (intent redirect, implicit intent resolution to unexpected handler) — indirect invocation path is the flow hijack confirmation |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| AppInternalPaths | Expected library load paths per app: /data/app/ |
| WritablePathList | /sdcard/, /data/local/tmp/, /data/data/ |