For Android, detect Data Manipulation from documented management, network, or vetting evidence; treat state queries as periodic observations rather than real-time events. Correlate API Calls via Application Vetting / Instrumented Dynamic Analysis [Dynamic API/runtime trace: ContentResolver.update() called by writer_app NOT IN $LegitimateIPCPartners$ for target_app's content provider URI]; Application State via Android Enterprise / EMM [Managed package inventory/status and package metadata]; File Modification via Application Vetting / Forensic Acquisition [Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: ContentResolver.update() or write() to path owned by target_app IN $HighValueAppList$ by writer_app != target_app — cross-app data modification]. Alert on a sequence or state change inconsistent with the device/app baseline, approved management policy, or expected user workflow; do not infer unobserved API calls, file/process activity, or payload content from management state alone.
| Data Component | Name | Channel |
|---|---|---|
| API Calls (DC0112) | mobile:DynamicAnalysis | Dynamic API/runtime trace: ContentResolver.update() called by writer_app NOT IN $LegitimateIPCPartners$ for target_app's content provider URI |
| Application State (DC0123) | android:EMM | Managed package inventory/status and package metadata |
| File Modification (DC0061) | mobile:ForensicArtifacts | Dynamic filesystem trace or acquired app-container/filesystem artifacts: ContentResolver.update() or write() to path owned by target_app IN $HighValueAppList$ by writer_app != target_app — cross-app data modification |
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| HighValueAppList | Banking, payment, enterprise auth, HR apps. Derive from MDM catalog by data tier. |
| LegitimateIPCPartners | Apps with declared content provider client relationships to target. Derive from app IPC graph. |